














Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Ringsager, K. (2017). 'Featuring the system': Hip Hop Pedagogy and Danish Integration Policies. Suomen
Antropologi, 42(2), 75-93. https://journal.fi/suomenantropologi/article/view/65787/26611
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 28, 2020
suomen antropologi  | volume 42 issue 2 summer 2017 75 
Kristine Ringsager
‘Featuring the SyStem’:  
hip hop pedagogy and  
daniSh integration policieS
abstract 
During the past decades rap and hip hop culture have been utilized and 
institutionalized in public programs combating the radicalization and 
criminalization of marginalized ethnic minority youths in Denmark. Such a 
use of rap music, in particular, in institutionalized social work and political 
matters has created what I refer to as a ‘rap as resource industry’ that 
operates within the social sector, parallel to the ‘regular’ music industry. 
This article analyses personal and political inferences in policies of the 
system among rappers who engage with this industry as social workers 
and educators. Such engagements are examined by way of the metaphor 
of the feature: a musical practice distinct to hip hop, based on reciprocity 
and mutual gain. This article examines how their precarious position as 
mediators between youths and the system affects the individual rappers 
and how they handle the implicit or explicit demands and expectations 
placed upon them. Many of such social, rap-based projects are considered 
by funding bodies and users alike as great successes. Yet the articles 
argues that the utilization of rap and hip hop culture as social technologies 
can be problematic, highlighting how neo-liberal policies of outsourcing 
public responsibility seem to invade and affect hip hop’s ideals of social 
responsibility and authenticity.
Keywords: Denmark, hip hop, integration, rap pedagogy, welfare state, social work
introduction: When 
Featuring the SyStem
Tactically I have articulated my musical 
projects to meet the Danish welfare model. 
(…) Totally deliberately, you know, in order 
to be able to make projects. (Ali, May 27, 
2014)1
If you look in the Cambridge Dictionary of 
English, the verb feature is defined as an act ‘to 
include someone or something as an important 
part’, and, within hip hop culture, the metaphor 
of the feature works as a musical practice based 
on support, reciprocity, and mutual gain for 
both parties of a musical collaboration. Based 
on material collected through my doctoral field 
research,2 this article examines and discusses 
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how rappers—primarily rappers of visible 
minority background3—within a Danish 
context feature the system and vice versa. In this 
case the system is a Scandinavian welfare state, 
or ‘the Danish welfare model’, as the rapper 
Ali puts it in the opening quote—a model that 
gives subsidies to, for instance, associations, 
youth clubs, and projects of societal interest that 
are based on the idea that citizens should have 
equal rights to social security and education. 
During my field research, several of 
the rappers I spoke with pointed out that 
the public social service sector working to 
advance citizenship and integration during 
the 2000s increasingly became a ‘business’, 
where rappers could be employed as ‘important 
parts’ mediating between the system and 
marginalized visible minority youths in Danish 
society. These new avenues of employment for 
rappers emerged in a post-9/11 context, where 
securitization was layered onto pre-existing 
concerns about integration, joining together 
parallel concerns about immigration, crime, and 
associations between Muslims and violence 
wherein visible minority youth were considered 
a problematic target group for interventions 
(Rytter and Pedersen 2013). Such use of rap and 
hip hop culture4 in political matters has created 
a kind of ‘rap as resource industry’ that operates 
within the social sector, in parallel to the ‘regular’ 
music industry. 
This article analyses personal and political 
inferences drawn from the policies of the system 
by rappers who engage with this industry, 
either by working within official integration 
and citizenship programs or by making their 
own musical practices, political ideologies, and 
social work align with these. In this article, I see 
the welfare state’s engagement with rappers as 
features, opening the analytical space to focus 
on the processes, negotiations, and at times 
awkward alliances between rap artists, their 
ideas about hip hop culture, and the system. 
These features come out in different versions—
from the artistic work of writing and producing 
theatre shows generating inter-cultural dialogue, 
through campaign songs communicating official 
messages and moralities, to educational, rap-
based social work with marginalized youths. 
When featuring rappers to do artistic work, 
the system often explicitly requests ‘their own 
words in your voice, written by you’ (Babak, 
February 4, 2014), as the rapper Babak has 
put it. Contrary to this, the features around 
educational work with marginalized minority 
youths often encompass complex positions 
and blurred power relations between the system, 
the rappers and the young target group. These 
features between the system and rappers engaging 
as rap coaches in social educational programs 
targeting marginalized visible minority youths—
most often young men (teenagers) living in 
socially disadvantaged urban areas—are the 
empirical focus in this article. Such features 
give rise to particular constellations of hip hop 
culture as a social technology, where rap music, 
in particular, works as an expedient resource 
to achieve the particular goal of making well-
behaved Danish citizens out of problematic 
visible minority youths. Furthermore, the 
features exemplify the moral ambiguity of the 
field of youth development in general—and the 
internal moral conflicts within hip hop culture 
in particular. 
In the following pages I expand upon 
these features: first, by elaborating the increasing 
blending of Danish integration policies and hip 
hop pedagogy post-9/11; second, by describing 
how features between rappers and the system 
can be understood within a theoretical frame 
of social technologies; third, by illustrating how 
rap coaches in their everyday lives negotiate 
their often difficult, fuzzy, and peculiar positions 
between the young target group and the 
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system, where they have to navigate between 
implicit or explicit (often differing) demands 
and expectations; and finally, by addressing the 
impact of rap as a social technology in relation to 
the young target group and in broader contexts 
of inclusion, integration, and citizenship within 
Danish society.
hip hop pedagogy  
in a poSt-9/11 World
When in spring 2009 I was coincidentally 
engaged as a singing teacher in a (now closed) 
non-profit organization working with rap 
music production in a socioeconomically 
disadvantaged area in the Danish capital of 
Copenhagen, I was pretty green about hip hop 
culture. Besides giving singing lessons, I hung 
out with some of the engaged rap coaches, 
social workers, and with the young teenage 
boys (and the few girls) attending the programs. 
Here I  was often met with stories about how 
engaging in the rap programs kept the young 
participants out of a criminal career, inspired 
them to read, to write, to express and articulate 
themselves, to engage in school work, to meet 
schedules, and to adapt to and cope with 
different social situations and people in their 
everyday lives. Many of the participants further 
explained to me how their parents urged them 
to go to the studio, to hang out with the coaches 
and to write and produce rap music—because, 
as a boy caricaturing his father expressed it: ‘It’s 
good you’ve found something you like doing, 
because otherwise you could have gotten into 
criminality’ (Underage rapper, February 1, 
2013).5 This stirred my curiosity. How could a 
musical form like rap, where dissent and violent 
imagery is a common part of the expressive 
repertoire, at the same time work as a means 
to prevent a criminal career and as a means of 
educating youths on ‘the edge of society’? And 
how did the rap coaches negotiate this moral 
ambiguity within hip hop culture in their 
educational work with the young participants?
On this specific organization’s now closed 
website, you could read that the purpose of the 
organization was ‘to create positive successful 
experiences and support the musical develop-
ment’ and how it would ‘work as an important 
mouthpiece and a diplomatic representative of 
the messages of the youths’ (Purpose and Vision, 
my translation). Furthermore, the organization 
described itself as:
a music association, a music school, a culture 
factory, a record company, an inclusion and 
multiplicity project in one. (…) a non-profit 
organization primarily working to make 
positive successful experiences for youths 
as well as initiating and conducting culture 
activities for people living in exposed areas 
(…) giving youths the opportunity to 
develop themselves musically, regardless 
of residence, economy and background. 
 (…) one of the very first agents in the 
strong, growing hip hop movement in 
the past few years—a movement, which is 
especially seen among youths with ethnic 
minority background in the Nordic capitals. 
(About Us, my translation)
This organization, which was initiated in 2006 
(and closed down in 2012), exemplifies how 
rap music and hip hop culture within Danish 
society has, since the 2000s, been utilized in 
social work for integration and citizenship-
building, addressing marginalized and 
vulnerable visible minority youths, with the 
economic support of public authorities as well 
as private funding. Managed by well-educated 
and socioeconomically advantaged rappers or 
producers—sometimes in cooperation with 
people working on multicultural issues—this 
suomen antropologi  | volume 41 issue 2 summer 2017 78 
Kristine Ringsager
kind of educational work varies between 
individual work in small studios, sometimes 
connected to local youth clubs, and larger 
associations with their own facilities and many 
employees. Generally speaking, empowerment 
emerges as the dominant discourse. But where 
some projects link empowerment to issues of self-
esteem and individualized optimism, others align 
it with more established practices of political 
communication and principles of community 
organizing (see also Ringsager 2015a). 
This use of rap as a social means revolving 
around educational and pro-social messages 
for marginalized youths can be understood in 
terms of mobilized activism and community 
organizing, which have been key elements of 
hip hop culture since it was placed on the map 
in the streets of New York City in the 1970s (see, 
e.g., Forman 2013). Since then it has often been 
argued within educational hip hop research 
that rap lyric production and analysis might 
comprise the basis for a ‘critical pedagogical’ 
framework for giving agency to marginalized 
cultural, ethnic, and racial minority youths all 
around the world. Inspired by Paulo Freire’s 
problem-posing method, (e.g., Freire 1990; 
1994) this so-called Critical Hip Hop Pedagogy 
(e.g., Hill 2009; Parmar 2009; Porfilio and Viola 
2012; Runell and Diaz 2007) has a deliberate 
emphasis on developing youths’ critical thinking 
skills through active exchange and discussion, 
making young people able to critique and 
question (‘deconstruct’) the veracity of dominant 
texts within society (Gosa and Fields 2012). 
Besides the pedagogical potential of motivating, 
creating and developing learning possibilities 
for youngsters, hip hop culture’s potential to 
engage youths around a ‘common third’ is 
emphasized, creating a kind of ‘belonging’ that 
aims to transcend marginalization and increase 
the social sense of self (Elkjær et al. 2015).
In Denmark, this Critical Hip Hop 
Pedagogy has, since the 2000s, been played 
out in the context of global securitization in a 
post 9/11-world, where the presence of young, 
male, visible minority youths in society has 
been problematized in new ways. The Danish 
state’s so-called ‘security / integration response’ 
(Bleich 2009: 355) to the internationally 
significant events of 9/11 (and to increasing 
instances of riots in Europe by marginalized 
minority urban youths) has led to policies 
including administrative expulsion, temporarily 
legalizing body searches without probable cause 
in certain urban areas, the repeal of compulsory 
mother tongue education in schools, and the 
introduction of a new citizenship examination 
(see Gad 2011; Rytter and Pedersen 2011). Such 
restricting political initiatives have had huge 
effects on the everyday lives of people from 
Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East 
or North Africa, and their descendants, who 
as a consequence of the securitization have 
become hyper-visible and subjected to scrutiny as 
problematic, stereotyped Others (Khawaja 2011). 
Furthermore, various pre-emptive measures 
and plans of action have been implemented. 
These include anti-radicalization programs 
in which, for example, so-called ‘front-line 
personnel of the welfare state’ (such as teachers 
and social workers) are trained to prevent 
and take action against processes of religious 
radicalization and other potential threats 
(Kühle 2011: 91–93). The featuring of socially 
engaged rappers and hip hop activists as a kind 
of ‘musical front-line personnel of the welfare 
state’ can thus be related to this process of 
securitization—a process that has contributed 
to professionalizing rap and hip hop culture in 
what Amir, the manager of the social project 
where I was engaged as a singing teacher, has 
referred to as ‘the integration business’ (Amir, 
June 7, 2012). 
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Rappers featuring the system as rap coaches 
in educational work within this ‘integration 
business’ often join critics in noting that rap 
music, due to commodification, has become 
a site of contestation with a corporate music 
industry incredibly adept at redirecting hip hop’s 
social energies away from critical expressions of 
struggle, protest, and resistance—and towards 
messages of materialism, greed, individualism, 
and the depiction of stereotypical racial and 
sexual identities, tacitly accepting misogyny and 
male sexism as well as masculine aggression and 
violence (see also Forman 2013). According to 
such critique, this not only devalues the ideals 
of hip hop culture but also negatively affects 
the young people listening to rap music. Amir 
exemplifies this worry when describing how 
the young people (most of them teenage boys) 
attending the workshop the first years looked up 
to the gangsta-rapper Marwan, who released his 
Danish-language debut album P.E.R.K.E.R.6 
the same year as Amir started his work:
The only thing they talked about was 
shooting: ‘We’re going to shoot, we gotta 
get some weapons’. And then they had 
Marwan in one ear: ‘We’re going to be 
[rapping] ‘perker, perker, perker’, ‘self-made 
well-made’, ‘perker, perker’. It was really 
an ugly picture. Suddenly, Marwan had 
become a role model for a generation 
of confused youngsters who didn’t know, 
what to do. (Amir, June 7, 2012)
Concerns about how Marwan’s stereotypical 
representation of the criminal perker influences 
the youths, illustrating the moral conflict within 
hip hop culture in general, are also presented 
by the rap coach Babak. He describes how 
the youngsters attending his workshops often 
identify as ‘gangsters’ through the music they 
listen to and by referring to themselves and 
friends with a ‘G’ after their names:
No matter which ghetto you enter, the 
kids will put G after their names. Ahmed 
G, Muhammed G, Abdi G—everybody 
G. G for ‘gangster’. It says a lot when, 
for instance, a six-year-old says ‘G’ about 
himself, right? (…) Their identities are 
developed around the so-called hip hop 
culture stressing topics like ‘I’m tough’, ‘We 
shoot in the ghettos’. 50 Cent lyrics and 
that stuff. Not that they’ll do it because 50 
Cent says it, but the music you listen to 
and what you identify with create a kind 
of frame for your life. (Babak, July 8, 2010) 
For most of the rappers and producers engaging 
in rap-based educational work, therefore, 
their main purpose is less to make the young 
participants successful rappers, than to produce 
values, ideals, and identities that can provide 
alternatives to commercially produced identities 
such as criminal gangsters, ‘niggas’ or ‘perkere’. 
As, for instance, rap coach Erkan, working at 
a youth club in a disadvantaged urban area, has 
put it:
Musically speaking, there are plenty of 
things you could work on getting better. 
And I present these things for them 
regularly, but it’s not my main focus. My 
main focus is the things they are writing. 
That they become more mature. (Erkan, 
June 27, 2013)
Furthermore, for several of the rap coaches 
and program managers I have spoken with, 
the motivation for engaging in this kind 
of educational work is based on personal 
experiences from their own childhood and 
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youth, and personal narratives of how music 
production had ‘saved’ them from ending up 
in a criminal career. In that sense, much of the 
work is based on identification and common 
experiences between the young participants and 
the rap coaches. As Babak has explained:
The most important thing—and the 
reason why you should support such 
projects economically—is because it gives 
empowerment. Not because it makes good 
musicians or rappers. It might spit out 
a  couple of groups, but more importantly, 
it gives people a feeling of success, right? 
In life. It gives people an identity. Instead 
of being the psycho with the hardest 
blow, you become the guy who can blow 
it hard in the mike, or the guy who writes 
good rhymes, or the guy who is good at 
beatboxing, or making beats or singing or 
(…) whatever, right? It gives people, who 
one way or the other are nothing but some 
fucking perkere another approach to life, 
where they can say, ‘I’m also a rapper’, and 
‘I’m the one being good at that’. That’s also 
why I began to rap. (Babak, July 8, 2010) 
Thus, rappers engaging in social work are often 
driven by philanthropic motivations, and a belief 
that the use of the right tools and techniques 
can allow the participants to be heard and 
understood within majority society and get 
them to behave in ways that will keep them on 
‘the right track’. It is, as Ali puts it, most often 
‘perkere helping perkere’ (Fieldnotes, July 7, 2010). 
As described however, this hip hop pedagogical 
activism has been adopted by the Danish 
welfare state as part of the securitization process 
implemented post-9/11. Besides bringing an 
increase in public funding to the area, this has 
also placed rap-based educational work within 
complex political negotiations and processes.
rap coaching aS a Social 
technology
There is this discourse saying that the 
reason why so many youngsters are 
hanging on the street, making trouble, is 
because they don’t have anything to do. So 
that’s the identification of the problem. 
And the available solutions: They don’t 
have anything to do and they don’t use the 
existing offers, so let’s offer some new. And 
because rap is part of their culture, and 
the people practicing hip hop—which are 
the people wanting to make the projects—
argue that that’s how it is, this became 
a solution. (Ali, December 21, 2010)
Ali was conscious of the complex political 
negotiations and processes behind his work, 
as were most of his rap coach colleagues. This 
awareness has made Ali position himself as 
a provider of solutions by designing structured 
rap music production programs and courses 
specifically targeting marginalized visible 
minority youths living in disadvantaged urban 
areas. In this way, as Ali pointed out, rap coaches 
and project managers like himself also appear to 
uphold the very idea that rap is the solution—
and thus something that the integration and 
citizenship-oriented part of the social sector 
should support. Rap coach Erkan has made 
a similar reflection:
The local communities and administrations 
are realizing that it [rap education] works. 
They hear from the institutions that, for 
instance, it attracts a lot of teenage boys 
and it keeps them off the streets. There 
is something anti-crime in it—because 
that is what they are told by, for instance, 
people like me: ‘It’s good they come here 
[to the youth club], because then they 
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can vent their frustrations in another and 
much better way than setting fire to cars.’ 
But you know, it’s not because we know 
that for sure. It’s the theory. (Erkan, June 
27, 2013)
As shown in Ali’s and Erkan’s statements, rap 
coaches and project managers are themselves 
involved in demonstrating that rap is ‘the 
solution’, when rappers feature the system in 
doing youth development work. The question 
remains, however, how this self-reinforcing 
process is best understood. 
The Swedish music education researcher, 
Johan Söderman (2011), has argued that 
there are apparent pedagogical continuities 
between traditional forms of Scandinavian 
non-formal education, Folkeoplysning (People’s 
Enlightenment),7 and the contemporary 
voluntary education of marginalized visible 
minority youths through rap and hip hop. 
According to Söderman, from its very beginning 
Folkeoplysning had had two sides to it. On the 
one hand, it has promoted the belief that people 
can achieve emancipation and empowerment 
through education. In this sense Folkeoplysning 
is a radical educational ideal empowering 
people through their own engagement and 
investment in education and social critique, 
with the ultimate aim of changing society. On 
the other hand it has also been—and still is—
used to discipline people, ideally replacing 
the ‘old habits’ and ‘bad taste’ of the poorly 
educated lower classes with more refined habits 
and tastes. In this sense, it can be regarded as 
an elitist educational ideal, where people are 
seen as objects to be ‘empowered’ and ‘helped’ 
to enlightenment, and where the overall aim 
is about taming and disciplining the ‘wild’ 
(working class). Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, 
Söderman claims that a certain degree of 
symbolic violence must be present, even when 
democratic ideals and intentions precondition 
educational concerns (Söderman 2011: 215; see 
also Ringsager 2015a). 
This entangling of (musical) education 
and (social) enlightenment, of agency and 
regulation, of emancipation and disciplining 
was intensely present in the everyday lives 
of the rappers I followed in their social work, 
as coaches, project leaders, studio owners or 
consultants. However, in order to understand 
the statements of Ali and Erkan quoted above, 
the educational enlightenment taking place 
within social, rap-based work might to a greater 
extent be regarded in terms of the Foucauldian 
notion of social technologies. Within this 
analytical approach, the production of rap music 
taking place within social institutionalized work 
is regarded as instrumentalized—as engineered, 
mobilized, and acted upon—and ‘integrated 
into a larger management technology that 
is structured to manifest particular kinds of 
citizenship’ (Forman 2013: 254). According to 
Foucault, all technologies are by default social 
(Foucault 1988: 18; see also Jöncke, Svendsen 
and Whyte 2004: 403; Rose, O’Malley and 
Valverde 2006: 85). Traffic lights are, for 
instance, a (scientific) technique that becomes 
a social technology when it is used to regulate 
the behavior of road users (see Jensen 2005: 43; 
Moos 2007: 9). Using the same terminology, 
rapping and writing rap lyrics is a technique 
that becomes a social technology when it is used 
in social work to achieve particular goals, like 
making well-behaved Danish citizens out of 
problematic visible minority youths. 
According to Jöncke, Svendsen and Whyte 
(2004: 391) social technologies can be defined 
by three characteristics: first, social technologies 
contain languages of power enabling and 
promoting certain actions and understandings, 
while regarding others as irrelevant and 
impossible; second, social technologies embed 
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possibilities and ideas about social interaction; 
and third, social technologies are ‘morally fixed,’ 
exercising power through their applicability to 
central values rather than through their actual 
efficiency. A particular social technology thus 
defines the very problem at the same time as 
defining the problem’s subjects and solutions. 
Moreover, it always contains an implicit moral 
rationale about what is the ‘right’ thing to do, 
as well as promises about what can be achieved 
if the problem subjects choose to act according 
to the outlined solution ( Jöncke, Svendsen and 
Whyte 2004: 394; Rose 2010: 52). Relatedly, 
Leif Moos (2009: 87) has noted how social 
technologies that are brought into a given social 
space are often described as ‘natural’ and ‘neutral’ 
tools that are readily available to practitioners. 
This conception of the ‘natural’ contributes 
to making social technologies ‘powerful but 
silenced forms of power’.
Further to the continuum encompassing 
Critical Hip Hop Pedagogy and People’s 
Enlightenment, social technologies can be 
understood as solutions to be implemented 
through institutional effort in light of particular 
social and cultural definitions of the problem. 
Looking at rap as a social technology helps us 
to understand Ali’s and Erkan’s analyses of their 
work in the wider context of the welfare state. 
The relationship between rappers, working as 
rap coaches, and youths, receiving help to write 
and produce rap music, always involves modes 
and languages of power, making it possible to 
promote certain actions and understandings. 
This also means that the positions occupied by 
the rap coaches are essential for the success 
of rap as the solution. They are in a position 
wherein they are supposed to act as role models 
to a group of young people that most often 
regards the system as intervening and regulating, 
while at the same time implementing the 
very regulation imposed by the supporting 
authorities. Thus, the implementation of power 
taking place within rap-based social work has to 
appear efficient to the system and the supporting 
authority, while at the same time appear ‘natural’ 
to the young participants.
It remains to be seen how rap coaches, 
deliberately articulating their work as outlined 
solutions to social worries about the crimi-
nalization and radicalization of marginalized 
youths, negotiate their position as enactors of 
social technologies in everyday life. What kinds 
of strategies do they put into play? And how 
do they practically impose particular moralities 




Shortly after I ended my work as a singing 
teacher in the social non-profit organization 
in Copenhagen in the summer of 2009, 
a similar rap-based project was abruptly (albeit 
temporarily) closed in the Danish city of 
Aarhus, and the rapper hired to coach the young 
participants was dismissed. The dismissal of 
the coach and the closure of the project were 
publically justified with these words by the 
responsible manager:
A song, which we can’t vouch for, has come 
out in public. The lyrics, which I am very 
sorry about, do not reflect the work we do 
on a daily basis. ( Justesen in Mikkelsen 
and Agger 2009, my translation)
The song referred to was titled ‘Messerschmidt 
Diss’ and was composed by one of the underage 
participants under the guidance of the now-
dismissed rap coach. It was a diss8 of several 
politicians, including the right-wing nationalist 
politician Morten Messerschmidt, a member 
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of The Danish People’s Party.9 In the rap, 
Messerschmidt was referred to through the 
following lines: ‘I’ve got a single bullet for 
Morten Messerschmidt / ‘cause he talks a lot 
of shit / he should come and suck my dick.’10 
When the lyrics of the song were printed as part 
of a local newspaper article about the project, 
they quickly made it into national media, 
igniting a heated debate and raising a series 
of critical questions regarding the use of rap 
as a resource in social work with marginalized 
youths before eventually leading to the closure 
of the rap program and dismissal of the rap 
coach.11 
The closure of the project, the dismissal 
of the rap coach and the huge media attention 
surrounding this one song demonstrates how 
the use of rap as a tool in social technologies 
imposes particular moralities, not only onto the 
young participants but also onto the rap coaches 
featuring the system who constantly have to 
negotiate the moral ambiguity associated with 
rap and hip hop culture. Although the case was 
an isolated incident, it resonated among the 
many project managers and rap coaches engaged 
in social work all over Denmark and created 
a heightened awareness of the power relations 
taking place within these projects. In particular, 
it highlighted the precarious position of rap 
coaches implementing the social technology of 
rap: on the one hand, controlling and regulating 
young people and, on the other, treating them 
with respect and giving them a voice within 
a  music culture where dissent and violent 
imagery is a common part of the expressive 
repertoire. Moreover, the rap coaches are often 
faced with the participants’ expectations of 
becoming good and successful rappers within 
the rap scene—and not necessarily good and 
successful citizens. As the rap coach and project 
manager Joseph has told me, ‘the youngsters 
are product-oriented, so it can’t just be about 
the process and the hippie pedagogy’ ( Joseph, 
June 14, 2012). All this leave the rap coaches in 
complex positions where they, in their day-to-
day work, have to balance and navigate between 
differing expectations and moral values.
In enacting this balancing act, rap coach 
Joseph has, for instance, described how he 
always tries to make participants focus on 
what he refers to as the ‘narrative, positive life 
story’—a story where the participants put their 
thoughts and feelings into words, describing 
their past in order to find their way forward 
( Joseph, June 14, 2012). Through discussions 
with the youths, he tries to give them a sense 
of belonging by ‘branding the identity of 
being Danish and branding the values of 
democracy’ ( Joseph June 14, 2012), as he puts 
it. Furthermore, the funding authorities often 
explicitly demand that the rap coaches, in their 
work, improve the Danish language skills of the 
participating youths (Fieldnotes, e.g. Ali, May 
20, 2014). Thus, as the Danish sociolinguists 
Andreas Stæhr and Lian M. Madsen also 
have shown (Stæhr and Madsen 2014), rap 
coaches often urge the young rappers to express 
themselves in a more standardized Danish 
when writing rap lyrics, using majority language 
terms rather than multi-ethnolectical terms that 
further emphasize their minority position in 
Danish society.
The guidance and supervision of lyrical 
productions in the context of social rap 
programs thus expose a pre-existing ideological 
framework as well as parameters of language and 
content promoting respect, non-antagonism, a 
positive life style, and an absence of (at least very 
strong) profanity. In doing so, the rap coaches 
do not only establish alternatives to prevailing 
gangsta themes in commercial and underground 
rap music, for as Forman (2013: 253–4) points 
out from an American context, rap coaches—
working as role models—also clearly advocate 
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what is often referred to as ‘conscious rap’, 
thereby imposing certain moral genre rules for 
the youngsters wishing to participate in the 
projects. That these rules often regulate access for 
individual young rappers is demonstrated in the 
way the rap coach Asem handles young rappers 
who wish to record in the studio he manages, 
which is affiliated with a local youth club. He 
told me how he always asked the young rappers 
to send him their lyrics before they got access to 
the studio. When I asked him how this process 
of regulation actually worked, he explained by 
referring to a Facebook-correspondence he had 
had with a young rapper: 
He [the young rapper] can’t get access to 
the studio before he has changed this [the 
lyrics]. That’s how I get him to think about 
it. ... The first thing I do is to ask why he 
makes a song like this with so many nasty 
words. I pass it on slowly. Then he tries 
again, sends me a revised text where he 
has removed some of the nasty words, but 
there are still many left. Then I tell him to 
remove this and that and send me a revised 
version of the song as soon as possible. 
And the third time, I directly change it all, 
and tell him, ‘That’s the way to do it. That’s 
what I mean. The other stuff doesn’t work.’ 
(Asem, February 1, 2013) 
As Asem emphasized, this regulating process 
was his way (as a rap coach and role model) to 
take responsibility, and to say, ‘Well, it’s not cool 
at all, you know, when you wanna shoot people 
and kill them and smash empty bottles on their 
heads’ (Asem, February 1, 2013).
Similarly, the rap coach Ali explained 
that when he interacts socially with the young 
participants, guiding them in picking a theme 
for a rap song and assisting in the actual 
writing and recording process, he conducts 
what he refers to as a ‘mainstreaming process’ 
(Ali, December 21, 2010), where he gradually 
introduces certain values and ideas that the 
youths slowly internalize. He emphasizes 
that his own status as a recognized rapper 
and musician is crucial in conducting this 
mainstreaming of certain moralities, because it 
gives ‘respect and justification. (…) It makes it 
possible to push the boys forward and still make 
demands and such things’ (Ali, December 21, 
2010). It is therefore the particular rap coach’s 
ability to balance his position as a mediator of 
different politically defined moralities, while 
maintaining his position as a recognized rapper, 
musician, and role model, that finally decides 
whether the social technology’s silenced forms 
of power can be successfully implemented as 
a ‘natural’ regulation of the musical and social 
behavior of the participating youths. The 
awareness of this often induces quite a few 
considerations for the individual rap coach. Rap 
coach Erkan, for instance, has often considered 
whether it is actually a disadvantage that 
the local youths know that he does not allow 
recordings of gangsta rap or songs with violent 
content—since this probably entails that some 
young people do not attend his rap workshops 
and studio sessions (Erkan June 27, 2013). 
Furthermore, the project manager Amir has 
explained how he is very aware of the fact that 
he: 
can’t just censor ... but you can say, ‘I really 
think it’s stupid, when you write that you 
want to stick a knife in his head. That’s 
not cool at all.’ You can say that to people. 
That’s the way to guide and supervise, until 
they understand what it means ... Tell 
them how things are done in the music 
business, what it is that makes one rap 
song a hit and not another—and in this 
sense use the music business and the music 
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as the pedagogical common denominator. 
Instead of just saying, ‘You just can’t do 
that.’ (Amir, June 7, 2012) 
If one should talk of a general pedagogical 
inclination it would be realness: ‘I’ve always 
been taught that I can’t lie in my songs,’ as an 
underage rapper has put it ( June 18, 2012). In 
order to implement moralities of being real, the 
rap coaches often urge the young rappers to 
adopt a position as an ‘everyday politician’ (Ali, 
December 21, 2010) representing other youths 
in their local ‘hood. However, according to my 
research, the regulations and the limitations of 
what are acceptable musical expressions in the 
context of rap programs is very much dependent 
on the rap coach’s personal estimation of the 
individual youths. As Asem explains: ‘If I know 
you’re a good and decent person, you can scream 
and shout what ever you like. But if I sense you’re 
some kind of psycho, we should definitely have 
a talk’ (Asem, February 1, 2013). Furthermore, 
what is regarded as acceptable musical 
expression depends on the specific situation and 
context of the particular performance. Several 
of the rap coaches with whom I have spoken 
seem to distinguish between what is accepted 
within internal workshops and studio sessions 
and what is accepted in public concerts or on 
albums released in the name of the projects or 
youth clubs. For example, an underage rapper, 
who has written and performed several songs 
for albums released by the rap project he 
attended, has explained how he and the rest of 
the participants were told that they could not 
contribute with songs that incited others to do 
something stupid—at least not, as he stressed, 
on the albums released in the name of the 
project ( June 20, 2012). 
There can be several motives for the 
exclusion of deviant expressions from albums 
publicly released by social projects. Joseph, the 
manager of a project that has released several 
albums with nationwide distribution, explained 
why he finds a curatorial approach to the lyrical 
content appropriate:
 
If we make an album financed by the 
municipality or something, it has to be 
within the scope of certain things. I explain 
that to them [the participants]. And then 
I try to make them understand, that there 
is no need to depict something that is not 
real. If it’s true that for instance you have 
seen a robbery or something, then it’s 
permitted to tell that story. But you have 
a responsibility towards those listening to 
your music and towards your little brothers 
and the next generation, who don’t know 
and who can’t distinguish between whether 
the story is a lie, or bragging, or something 
real. ( Joseph, June 14, 2012) 
For Joseph the choice to exclude deviant or 
radical expressions from the albums is supported 
by moral arguments about responsibility towards 
the younger generation. Here, he emphasizes 
that an important strategy in the use of rap 
music production as a social technology is also 
the musical mediation of the positive life story 
to a broader audience of youths. 
Besides these pedagogical and moral 
intentions, the regulation of lyrical content 
should also be understood in an economic 
context. Within this context, the regulation 
of lyrics is important for obtaining (further) 
funding to continue the rap-based educational 
work—as well as to maintain the jobs of the 
rap coaches and project managers themselves. 
It is therefore worth noting that, even though 
the rap coaches I have met in my field research 
are driven by philanthropic values, they hold 
positions they are paid to perform.12 Hence, 
as the musical output of the projects might 
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be regarded as a parameter of the individual 
project’s success, the participants are not only 
mouthpieces for their local ‘hood or the people 
with whom they identify, they also represent 
the projects (or youth clubs) to which they are 
affiliated, and thus the rap coaches employed 
there. This is something that provides another 
dimension to the complex position of rappers 
featuring the system as well as to the desired 
success of the particular rap program.
rap aS reSource: 
expediency and ‘Forced 
meanS oF integration’
As mentioned earlier in this article, I have been 
told many stories about how individual youths 
attending rap-based programs have gained 
self-confidence, have learned to reflect upon 
themselves as individuals and social agents 
within society, and thus have been ‘civilized’ 
(Gilliam and Gulløv 2012). I have also listened 
to stories—told by rap coaches as well as by the 
youths themselves—about how youths have 
gone from making what a rap coach called ‘thug-
life-2pac-outlaw stuff ’ (Fieldnotes, December 
9, 2013) to rapping about experiences of being 
a teenager in the local ‘hood, about how they 
felt about the political situation, about girls, or 
about schoolwork and parents—and how this 
change in attitude had a positive effect on their 
everyday life.
Such stories seem to indicate that youths, 
adapting to the rules of the rap programs, are 
conscious of the objectives of these programs 
and self-consciously seek to meet them when 
asked about their learning outcomes. However, 
it also indicates that the social technologies 
carried out by the rap coaches, and the silent 
power practiced through the mainstreaming 
processes in many ways have the potential to 
educate the youths in adapting to the rules, to 
make them ‘behave’, and to help those who want 
to be helped to get on the ‘right track’ in life. 
The very music produced within the programs 
is, furthermore, often a result of many hours of 
hard work and (at least in the best productions) 
is often highly valued not only by the 
participants themselves but also by other youths 
in the local community. Moreover, competitions 
like Rapkings,13 where young rappers from all 
around Denmark vie for the position of Rapking 
of the year, not only work as motivators for the 
youths but also create a network between young 
rappers from very different (geographical as well 
as socio-economical) local communities around 
Denmark. Several participants in the projects I 
have followed have additionally performed in 
television talent shows like MGP (the Danish 
Junior Song Contest hosted by the Danish 
Broadcasting Corporation) or X Factor. In this 
sense, some of the youths attending rap-based 
programs actually manage to reach a broader 
audience, thereby musically mediating the 
‘positive life stories’ to the local network and the 
surrounding society.
Finally, the many local rap programs and 
workshops in disadvantaged housing areas 
which have been established during the past 
10–15 years have contributed to making visible 
minority youths active, not only in their local 
communities (through concerts, studios, album 
releases, rap music educational workshops 
etc.) but also in the commercial rap scene 
in Denmark. As Ali has argued, many of the 
more talented local young rappers, though not 
participating in the rap programs, have used 
facilities and studios and performed at gigs 
and on compilation albums released by social 
projects (Ali, June 8, 2012). For this reason, the 
very presence of publicly funded rap programs 
and studios in certain neighborhoods has, 
according to Ali, contributed to bringing visible 
minority rappers from a marginal position 
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within the commercial rap scene to a more 
dominant one (see Ringsager 2016).
However, in order to get a broader and 
more complex understanding of the effect of 
rap as a social technology working to promote 
inclusion and integration of marginalized 
visible minority youths within Danish society, 
it is worth dwelling a bit on the articulated 
conceptions underlying precisely why rap 
music and hip hop culture are articulated 
as the solutions to such societal problems. 
George Yúdice (2003: 38) defines the concept 
‘expediency’ as a performative understanding 
of ‘the strategies implied in any invocation of 
culture, any invention of tradition, in relation 
to some purpose or goal’. When culture 
contains the opportunity to reach a  goal, you 
can, according to Yúdice, speak of culture 
as a resource (ibid.). Applying this to my 
subject field, the general understanding of 
the expediency of rap as a resource in social 
technologies targeting marginalized visible 
minority youths is closely connected to the 
idea that ‘rap is part of their culture’, as Ali 
said: ‘They all wear the clothes; they all listen to 
the music. And when you are part of a culture, 
there will always be a lot of people dreaming 
about being a performer’ (Ali, December 21, 
2010). It has often been suggested that rap 
and hip hop culture have evolved as a kind of 
lingua franca or a ‘resistance vernacular’ (Potter 
1995: 68) among urban youths on a global scale, 
encompassing the mobility of immigrants and 
refugee youths (Forman 2013: 249). The origin 
of the aesthetic expressions of hip hop culture 
among marginalized African-Americans in the 
cities of the USA, and a persistent image of 
rap as the political mouthpiece of ‘the ghetto’, 
seem to have led the way for the use of rap 
among groups feeling marginalized in other 
contexts. The conception that ‘rap is part of their 
culture’ is thus based on the idea that the rap 
scene and hip hop culture constitute a diasporic 
community, creating a space of identification for 
youths who experience being marginalized and 
alienated in the national space of identification. 
In this sense, the choice of rap appears ‘natural’, 
but it also allows for a simplified reproduction 
of the public image of visible minority youths, 
establishing hip hop as the youth culture, 
providing the grounds for its appropriation and 
reproduction both by the youths themselves and 
by policy makers and social workers. 
Where the idea that ‘rap is part of their 
culture’ is appropriated in all features between 
the system and rappers, the expediency of rap’s 
relating to musical and lyrical production 
processes in social and educational programs is 
also closely attached to the conception of rap 
as being ‘easy to learn’ (compared with other 
forms of music). This conception has been 
a  recurring statement by the rap coaches and 
project managers whom I have spoken with: ‘It’s 
much easier to sit with pen and paper compared 
with learning to play music. Then you need an 
instrument and everything, you know,’ as the 
rap coach Joseph has explained ( June 14, 2012). 
Likewise, Erkan has described how he finds that, 
‘It’s much easier to express yourself through rap 
than through singing in a blues or rock band. 
This is much more difficult to set up, because 
you need a band and so on’ ( June 27, 2013). 
Sometimes the rap coaches I have spoken with 
have underpinned this notion of rap as an ‘easy 
to learn kind of music’ with arguments that rap 
for this reason is more ‘democratic’ than other 
kinds of music (see. e.g.. Ali, December 21, 
2010; Deniz, September 2, 2014). 
Furthermore, Amir relates the conception 
of rap being easier to learn than other kinds 
of music to the fact that rap can provide 
a quick feeling of success, and thus is suited to 
engage particular visible minority youths from 
underprivileged urban areas:
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As I see it, the reason why so many 
Muslim boys are rapping is because it’s 
easier than spending time and energy on 
learning to play the guitar, for instance. 
Because it’s definitely harder to become 
a good guitarist than a rapper. Becoming 
a lyrical rapper is the easiest thing in 
the world. And it’s also a shortcut to get 
recognition, and it’s a shortcut to get in 
the spotlight, it’s a shortcut to get some 
girls, it’s a shortcut to get more friends, it’s 
a shortcut to get social acquaintances. Or 
at least they think so! That’s how I see it. 
Because, if you go to a local youth club in, 
for instance, North Zealand [a well-off area 
north of Copenhagen], then the girls and 
boys are practicing day after day: ‘We’re 
going to get the perfect singing voice, and 
we’ll spend ten years on it’. Whereas here 
[a disadvantaged area in Copenhagen] 
nobody wants to spent ten years on that! 
Because their dad’s standing right in front 
of them telling them: ‘Go out and make 
some money. Money is the most important 
thing.’ (Amir, June 7, 2012)
In this view, it is essential that rap is easily 
accessible if you wish to target what Amir 
calls ‘Muslim boys’ living in disadvantaged 
urban areas. The key question, according to 
Amir, is the upbringing of the boys, where 
money precludes the time you should spend on 
becoming a good musician / artist.14 Although 
several rap coaches have stressed that of course 
it requires both talent and exercise to become 
a good rapper, the recurring conception of rap 
music as ‘much easier’ (or ‘easier to learn than 
for instance singing or playing the guitar’) is a 
strong premise for the expediency of rap as a 
social technology—and is not without problems. 
First, rap programs, courses, and workshops 
are rarely affiliated to public music schools 
(i.e., music training institutions for children 
and young people which are very common in 
Denmark), but are most often associated with 
youth clubs (ungdomsskoler) or the work of 
independent social organizations with their own 
facilities, which are often placed in the center of 
a disadvantaged area with a high percentage of 
inhabitants with an ethnic minority background. 
The argument for doing so is most often that 
it is in order to meet the target group on their 
own terms. Obviously, the lack of rap classes 
in music schools can be explained in terms 
of history, traditions, employment policies, 
and the scope of activities carried out in this 
particular educational environment that often 
focuses on technical skills and individual 
musical excellence. However, the choice of not 
supplying rap music at the more established 
music schools also underlines the idea that 
rap is a particular kind of resource, a particular 
social technology, targeting a particular group 
of primarily male, visible minority youths in 
order to keep them ‘off the street’ and shape 
them into ‘good citizens’. Citizenship-building 
rather than music education, production, and 
the shaping of good musicians is the objective, 
something also illustrated by the rap coaches’ 
statements presented in this article. However, 
this difference in rap education and other kinds 
of music education contributes to creating 
a distinction between young people rapping, and 
young people singing, playing the guitar, and so 
forth, just like it might attribute to rap a lower 
aesthetic status in generalized perceptions of 
musical genre hierarchies. Contrary to music 
schools, which are very expensive to attend, it 
is, furthermore, much cheaper—sometimes 
totally free—to attend rap classes or workshops 
affiliated to youth clubs or social projects. If the 
young participants’ socio-economic capacities 
are taken into account, the distinction is almost 
self-reinforcing, thereby also reproducing the 
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social distinctions and categorizations that are 
connected with the execution of different kinds 
of music and genres.
Second, as argued above, a vital point 
relating to social technologies is that they not 
only ‘solve’ a defined problem, they also ascribe 
certain understandings, perspectives, and values 
to the problem—and in doing so, they also 
constitute the problem ( Jöncke, Svendsen and 
Whyte 2004). Social technologies are thus not 
only implemented with a view to solve a specific 
problem, they also create a particular social 
reality. Philosopher Ian Hacking describes 
such a process by using the notion of ‘dynamic 
nominalism’ (Hacking 1999 [1986]), which 
indicates that a thing does not become a named, 
categorized phenomenon until it is recognized 
as such. Consequently, dynamic nominalism 
describes an anti-essentialist philosophy of 
becoming-something (Hacking 1999: 165). One 
of the consequences of positioning rap and hip 
hop culture as the most expedient music culture 
for engaging visible minority youths—thereby 
generating subsidies to people designing and 
implementing rap-based projects and programs 
in the field of integration and citizenship-
building—is a high concentration of rap 
programs and studios in underprivileged urban 
areas (compared with other kinds of cultural 
offerings in the locales). This concentration 
might induce young people living there to think 
that this is the type of music they can make and 
thus do make. 
This institutionalization of rap in social 
technologies, and the economic support of rap 
workshops, programs, and studios in certain 
areas (where engaged rap coaches are waiting 
to help marginalized youth) also contributes 
to reproducing the idea of rap as ‘part of 
their culture’—both internally, in the local 
communities and externally, in the surrounding 
society. As visible minority youths to a greater 
extent do begin to rap, it gets even easier to draw 
the conclusion that this is because rap is ‘part 
of their culture’—and, as a consequence, that 
if something could latch onto ‘their culture’ it 
would have to be ‘easy to learn’. With a self-
reinforcing effect, this once again makes it easier 
for rappers wishing to engage in social work 
to obtain the means to do it, because they can 
easily convince public and private authorities 
that rap is the best way to reach out to visible 
minority youths. The idea of the expediency of 
rap as a resource in social technologies targeting 
marginalized visible minority youths thus 
becomes manifest—and the category gets ‘real’ 
(Hacking 1999: 168). 
This self-reinforcing process creates the 
‘danger’ that rap and hip hop culture increasingly 
become related to this group of young people 
which, in light of ideals of inclusion, may well 
be problematic. Echoing anthropologist Inger 
Sjørslev (2011), this raises the question of 
whether the efforts to include marginalized 
visible minority youths in rap-based educational 
programs might have the consequence of 
actually excluding them. Several of the rap 
coaches and social workers I have spoken with 
are aware of this paradoxical question. They have 
described how, despite the best of intentions of 
promoting agency, self-awareness, and inclusion 
through rap, to their frustration they see in their 
daily work that this sometimes contributes to an 
isolation of the participants from other young 
people in the neighborhood or from other 
musicians and the music industry. Hence, as the 
social worker, Birgitte, has argued, the use of 
rap to integrate specifically marginalized visible 
minority youths in society actually risks having 
the opposite effect:
The reality is that when you give the 
migrant boys the majority in rap 
communities, you’re helping them without 
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actually helping them. Because, if you’re 
going to make rap projects, ethnicity 
should not be the main factor. But that’s 
what’s happening. Rap is used as a forced 
means of integration. (Birgitte, December 
16, 2010)
As clarified by Birgitte, features between the 
system and socially and politically engaged 
rappers might risk using rap as a ‘forced 
means of integration’. Working with the best 
of intentions and with what is established as 
the ‘right’ tools and techniques for integration 
and inclusion of the target group in Danish 
society, the particular constellation of rap as an 
expedient resource in social technologies entails 
the danger of reproducing and reinforcing the 
very societal problems it works to solve.
concluding remarkS: 
Beyond ‘perkere helping 
perkere’
Utilizing rap music as an expedient tool in 
social technologies targeting marginalized 
minority youths ‘on the edge of society’ has, as 
illustrated throughout this article, also utilized 
rappers as agents in what Amir referred to as 
the ‘integration business’ (Amir, June 7, 2012). 
In many ways this has professionalized social 
work with rap music production and it has 
created a kind of ‘rap as resource industry’ 
engaging rappers as rap coaches, social workers, 
and project managers. Based on Yúdice’s 
idea of the expediency of culture it is obvious 
that, in the Danish context of integration 
of visible minority youths, rap music and 
hip hop culture have been ‘invoked to solve 
problems that previously were the province 
of economy and politics’ (Yúdice 2003: 25). 
Furthermore, rap and hip hop culture have 
become doubly expedient: first and foremost, 
as a social technological resource mobilized to 
solve problems related to social integration and 
the turning of marginalized youths into ‘good 
citizens’; but the particular constellation of rap 
as a resource has also established a niche in the 
formal labor market between the music industry 
and the social sector: creating jobs for rappers. 
James Hay has suggested that because:
a neoliberal form of governance assumes 
that social subjects are not and should not 
be subject to direct forms of state control, 
it relies upon mechanisms for governing 
‘through society’, through programs 
that shape, guide, channel—and upon 
responsible, self-disciplining social subjects. 
(Hay 2003: 166)
When featuring the system, rap coaches poten-
tially constitute just such an institutional 
mechanism, capable of adjusting particular 
forms of outsourcing. In this sense the rap 
coaches are positioned in ungrateful yet 
powerful positions working to cure societal 
illnesses and ‘civilize’ youths marginalized and 
alienated from society. As shown in this article, 
rap coaches are often aware of this position, 
negotiating not only the moral ambiguity 
within hip hop culture but also the moral values 
imposed by supporting the authorities in their 
daily work with the youths. As is evident from 
the statements of the participants, many of them 
do this successfully as they internalize narratives 
of integration and citizenship building and 
causally relate this to the act of rap music 
production. However, in designing rap-based 
programs specifically targeting marginalized 
visible minority youths on the basis of 
conceptions of rap as ‘part of their culture’ and 
‘easy to learn’, there are risks that the projects 
might actually exacerbate the excluded and 
subordinate position of the young participants 
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in Danish society. By professionalizing 
rap within the ‘integration business’ the 
social engagement of the rap coaches has 
moved beyond ‘perkere helping perkere’ (Ali, 
Fieldnotes, July 7, 2010). It has been placed 
within a  complex network of institutionalized 
authorities and integration policies where the 
rap coaches act as institutional mechanisms of 
the same authorities and policies that, in their 
own music, they often call into question.
noteS
1 All the interviews quoted in this article were 
conducted in Danish and translated into English 
by the author.
2 Between 2010–2014 I conducted field research 
among visible minority rappers (see note 3), 
focusing on the role of commercial rap as well 
as social rap-based work in the tension between 
inclusion and exclusion of visible minorities in 
Denmark. Spread across this period, among other 
things, I regularly participated in social projects 
involving rap music production (some of which 
are now closed) and interviewed rap coaches, 
project managers, and participants affiliated 
to these. In total, I conducted 42 interviews 
with 33 rappers, producers, and other persons 
affiliated the rap scene. (Ringsager 2015b; see 
also Ringsager 2013; Ringsager 2015a; Ringsager 
2016).
3 I use ‘visible minorities’ as a generic term to 
refer to people who are refugees, immigrants, or 
descendants of people from Muslim-majority 
countries in the Middle East or Northern Africa.
4 It is not the aim of this article to discuss whether 
rap has become an independent genre or musical 
form without a necessary connection to hip hop 
culture (see also Krogh 2006). Nor is it the aim 
to define or draw boundaries between real and 
unreal or between underground and commercial 
hip hop. Rather than drawing up categories, I 
am interested in conceptualizing the musical 
and cultural practices that lie behind individual 
orientations towards certain ideals, for instance 
real or unreal. 
5 It should be mentioned that I have also 
experienced the opposite: a young teenage boy 
attending rap workshops without his parents’ 
acceptance and awareness, because his father (due 
to religious belief ) objected to his son rapping 
(Fieldnotes, April 20, 2010).
6 Perker is originally an ethnic slur in the Danish 
language, which (like ‘nigga’ in the USA) has been 
reappropriated by visible minority youngsters as 
an identification used to mark a distance from 
Danish identification and Danish society. To 
identify as perker is a strategy most often used 
in order to deal with feelings of exclusion and in 
trying to sustain a sense of agency in life (see also 
Jensen 2011). 
7 Folkeoplysning (or People’s Enlightenment) was 
a  movement established in the 19th century, 
under the guidance of the Danish preacher and 
poet N. F. S. Grundtvig, working to develop 
knowledge and self-consciousness among the 
peasants. The movement of Folkeoplysning, 
whose ideas and methods were later taken up 
by the Workers’ movement, created a number 
of institutions of education and cooperation 
with a lasting effect on the development of the 
Scandinavian countries into modern democratic 
welfare societies. 
8 Diss is a shortened version of ‘disrespect’, and 
a  diss track or a diss song is, in hip hop slang, 
a song primarily intended to disrespect a person 
or group. 
9 Messerschmidt was at the time a household 
name partly because of his radical political views, 
partly because of his frequent appearances in 
glossy tabloid magazines with his girlfriend who 
is a cabaret singer.
10 My translation of the original Danish lyrics: ‘Jeg 
har en enkelt patron for Morten Messerschmidt / for 
han snakker masser shit / han sku’ kom’ og sut min pik.’
11 See Ringsager 2015a or Ringsager 2015b for 
a closer description of the debate.
12 People engaged in temporary positions in self-
financed projects or organizations dependent 
on private or public economical support are, of 
course, in much more exposed positions—and 
have much more at risk—than people engaged in 
permanent positions in, for instance, youth clubs. 
In the context of this article, this is something 
I have chosen not to take into consideration. 
However, in an economical perspective, this 
distinction is of course important.
13 The annual competition, Rapkings, was initiated 
by the rapper Adonis Gomez from the rap 
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group KNA in cooperation with the council of 
Copenhagen and youth clubs around Denmark. 
14 Several rappers (both young teenagers and more 
established rappers on the commercial hip hop 
scene) have substantiated this argument, pointing 
to how their parents always have expected them 
to prioritize their work or studies over their 
music.
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